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The Patchwork Principle against 
Self-Incrimination under the Charter 
Lisa Dufraimont* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Under our system of criminal justice, the state bears the burden of 
proving the accused’s guilt and may not conscript the accused to help 
build a case against him or her. The fundamental idea that the individual 
cannot be compelled to assist in her own prosecution is known as the 
principle against self-incrimination. Recognition of this principle in its 
broad form emerged only recently in Canadian law; in the 1970s, the 
prevailing view was that there existed no overarching principle against 
self-incrimination.1 The leading proponent of this view, Ed Ratushny, 
acknowledged that several legal doctrines — including the voluntary 
confessions rule and the non-compellability of the accused at trial — 
seemed to reflect disapproval of compulsory self-incrimination.2 How-
ever, Ratushny argued that the idea of a general right against self-
incrimination could be used, at best, only to describe a disparate collec-
tion of procedural and evidentiary rules.3 Even if this group of rules, as a 
whole, could be said to indicate that the law took a dim view of self-
incrimination, that view was “speckled to an extent that, to refer to it, 
[was] more likely to create confusion than to assist in any way”.4 
Consequently, Ratushny concluded that there was no independent, 
functional principle against self-incrimination from which legal conse-
quences could flow.5 
                                                                                                             
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen’s University. The author would like to thank 
Don Stuart and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on an earlier draft. 
1 See Ed Ratushny, “Is There a Right Against Self-Incrimination in Canada?” (1973) 19 
McGill L.J. 1, at 76 [hereinafter “Ratushny, ‘Is There a Right?’”]; Ed Ratushny, “Self-Incrimination: 
Nailing the Coffin Shut” (1978) 20 Crim. L.Q. 312, at 352. On the influence of Ratushny’s views, 
see David M. Paciocco, “Self-Incrimination: Removing the Coffin Nails” (1989) 35 McGill L.J. 73 
[hereinafter “Paciocco, ‘Removing the Coffin Nails’”]. 
2 Ratushny, “Is There a Right?”, id., at 2. 
3 Id., at 3. 
4 Id., at 77. 
5 Id., at 3. 
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Times have changed. Since the advent of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms,6 an independent, functional principle against self-
incrimination has indeed taken root in Canadian law. The Supreme Court 
has recognized this “overarching”,7 “organizing principle”8 as a principle 
of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter.9 The constitutional 
principle against self-incrimination has come to be understood as 
undergirding a number of pre-existing legal rules and has also become a 
source of new legal protections. Current safeguards against self-
incrimination in Canadian law are more numerous and more robust than 
ever. 
Without detracting from the significance of these developments, this 
paper aims to show that the Canadian principle against self-incrimination 
remains (to borrow a phrase from Ratushny) troublingly “speckled”. The 
available protections are strong in some areas and weak or absent in 
other contexts where self-incrimination concerns appear equally press-
ing. It will be argued that the patchwork quality of Canadian self-
incrimination law can be explained, at least in part, by the Supreme 
Court’s inconsistent approach to the problem of compulsion. The 
analysis begins in Part II with an overview of the principle against self-
incrimination, including a discussion of its emergence as a Charter 
principle, the rationales offered for self-incrimination protections and the 
various legal rules animated by the principle. Part III will discuss the 
central, contested distinction between free choice and compulsion. In 
Part IV, the focus will narrow to undercover operations, which will serve 
as an example of a context where the current law provides inadequate 
protection. The analysis concludes in Part IV. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE PRINCIPLE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
Before the Charter, the law’s protection against self-incrimination 
per se was generally understood to be limited to the privilege against 
self-incrimination. In 1976, the Supreme Court of Canada firmly rejected 
                                                                                                             
6 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
7 R. v. White, [1999] S.C.J. No. 28, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417, at paras. 44-45 (S.C.C.) [hereinaf-
ter “White”]; R. v. P. (M.B.), [1994] S.C.J. No. 27, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 555, at para. 37 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “M.B.P.”]. 
8 M.B.P., id., at para. 36. 
9 For example, White, supra, note 7, at para. 40. 
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an attempt to extend self-incrimination principles beyond this narrow 
testimonial context: 
The limit of the privilege against self-incrimination is clear. The 
privilege is the privilege of a witness not to answer a question which 
may incriminate him. That is all that is meant by the Latin maxim nemo 
tenetur seipsum accusare, often incorrectly advanced in support of a 
much broader proposition.10 
Even at the time, this modest account of self-incrimination principles 
was an oversimplification. It is true that the common law privilege 
against self-incrimination entitled a witness to refuse to answer questions 
where the answers might incriminate her.11 More particularly, the 
privilege historically encompassed both the non-compellability of the 
accused as a witness for the Crown and the privilege of an ordinary 
witness to refuse to answer incrimination questions.12 
However, while the accused remains non-compellable to this day, the 
witness privilege was abrogated by statute in Canada long before the 
adoption of the Charter. Section 5 of the Canada Evidence Act13 elimi-
nates a witness’s privilege to refuse to answer and replaces it with 
another form of protection known as use immunity. The witness can be 
compelled to answer incriminating questions but, provided the witness 
objects on self-incrimination grounds at the time of testifying, the 
witness’s testimony cannot be used against her in a future criminal trial.14 
Thus modified by statute, the common law privilege offered protection 
that was limited to testimony given in formal proceedings and was 
generally thought to exhaust the law’s concern with self-incrimination. 
With the benefit of hindsight, these pre-Charter safeguards against self-
incrimination appear weak and incomplete.15 
                                                                                                             
10 R. v. Marcoux, [1975] S.C.J. No. 54, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 763, 24 C.C.C. (2d) 1, at 4 C.C.C. 
(S.C.C.), per Dickson J. for the Court. 
11 This privilege finds protection under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States. 
12 R. v. S. (R.J.), [1995] S.C.J. No. 10, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 451, at para. 62 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“R.J.S.”]. 
13 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5. 
14 Canada Evidence Act, id., s. 5(1) and 5(2). 
15 David M. Paciocco, “Self-Incrimination and the Case to Meet: The Legacy of Chief 
Justice Lamer” (2000) 5 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 63 [hereinafter “Paciocco, ‘Self-Incrimination and the 
Case to Meet’”] (pre-Charter legal protections against self-incrimination were “feeble”: at 65). 
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1. Self-Incrimination under the Charter 
When the Charter came into force in 1982, one might have predicted 
that the law on self-incrimination would undergo little change. Only two 
of the Charter’s provisions appear on their face to be aimed at self-
incrimination problems, and both seem to adopt the pre-existing law. 
Section 11(c) provides that “[a]ny person charged with an offence has the 
right not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings against that 
person in respect of the offence.” That provision simply confirms and 
constitutionalizes the non-compellability of the accused at trial. Section 
13 of the Charter states that 
[a] witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right not to have 
any incriminating evidence so given used to incriminate that witness in 
any other proceedings, except in a prosecution for perjury or for the 
giving of contradictory evidence. 
That section has the effect of enhancing and conferring constitutional 
status on the use immunity that originated as a statutory substitute for the 
witness privilege. Section 13 use immunity is enhanced in the sense that 
it arises automatically, whereas section 5(2) of the Canada Evidence Act 
confers use immunity only on those who object at the time of testifying. 
Had the Charter analysis of self-incrimination been confined to sec-
tions 11(c) and 13, the law in this area would have made little progress. 
However, the Supreme Court looked beyond these provisions to recog-
nize a broad principle of self-incrimination as an element of fundamental 
justice under section 7.16 The principle was perhaps best stated by Lamer 
C.J.C., writing for the majority of the Court in M.B.P.: 
Perhaps the single most important organizing principle in criminal law 
is the right of an accused not to be forced into assisting in his or her 
own prosecution. ... This means, in effect, that an accused is under no 
obligation to respond until the state has succeeded in making out a 
prima facie case against him or her. In other words, until the Crown 
establishes that there is a “case to meet”, an accused is not compellable 
in a general sense (as opposed to the narrow, testimonial sense) and 
need not answer the allegations against him or her.17 
                                                                                                             
16 For example, M.B.P., supra, note 7, at para. 37; White, supra, note 7, at para. 40; R.J.S., 
supra, note 12, at paras. 94, 97. 
17 M.B.P., id., at para. 36. On the central role of Lamer C.J.C. in the development of this 
principle, see Paciocco, “Self-Incrimination and the Case to Meet”, supra, note 15 (Lamer C.J.C. 
was primarily responsible for “dredg[ing] from beneath the cautious language of these provisions 
[ss. 11(c) and 13] an affirmative right to remain silent, the principle of a case to meet, and the 
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In this passage, Lamer C.J.C. explicitly disavowed a narrow conception 
of self-incrimination law that would limit its protection to the giving of 
testimony in formal proceedings. Rather, the broad principle against self-
incrimination can protect a suspect from compulsion in any context 
where the state might try to extract incriminating evidence from him or 
her.18 
2. Specific Rules Reflecting the Principle 
The principle against self-incrimination has come to be regarded as 
animating a variety of constitutional, statutory and common law rules. 
Self-incrimination law in Canada is vast and complex, so an exhaustive 
survey would exceed the bounds of this paper. For present purposes, it 
will be sufficient to review a number of specific rules reflecting the 
principle. 
In the constitutional context, as we have seen, sections 11(c) and 13 
of the Charter protect individuals from being compelled to incriminate 
themselves directly and indirectly in the context of formal testimony.19 
The Charter right to counsel that arises on detention under section 10(b) 
also reflects the principle against self-incrimination;20 the ultimate 
purpose of affording detainees legal advice is to permit them to under-
stand and effectively exercise their rights, including the right to be silent 
in the face of an accusation by the state.21 Finally, recognition of the 
principle against self-incrimination as a principle of fundamental justice 
under section 7 means that constitutional safeguards against self-
incrimination can emerge in contexts not specifically addressed by the 
Charter text.22 
                                                                                                             
conception of ‘choice’ that now animates the law of self-conscription”: at 68); Don Stuart, “Chief 
Justice Antonio Lamer: An Extraordinary Judicial Record of Reform of the Canadian Criminal 
Justice System” (2000) 5 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 51, at 54. 
18 See R. v. Jones, [1994] S.C.J. No. 42, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 229, at para. 29 (S.C.C.) [hereinaf-
ter “Jones”], Lamer C.J.C. dissenting. 
19 See R. v. Henry, [2005] S.C.J. No. 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Henry”] 
(by exempting the accused from being compelled to testify at her own criminal trial, s. 11(c) guards 
against the testimonial self-incrimination that is “direct”: at para. 39); R. v. Dubois, [1985] S.C.J. 
No. 69, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dubois”] (use immunity for prior testimony under 
s. 13 operates “to protect individuals from being indirectly compelled to incriminate themselves”: at 
358). 
20 For example, White, supra, note 7, at para. 44. 
21 R. v. Sinclair, [2010] S.C.J. No. 35, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 310, at para. 24 (S.C.C.), McLachlin 
C.J.C. and Charron J. [hereinafter “Sinclair”]. 
22 White, supra, note 7 (the s. 7 principle against self-incrimination grants “residual protec-
tion”: at para. 44). 
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The broad section 7 principle against self-incrimination has been 
superimposed as a modern justification for various rules that developed 
historically for other reasons. Consider the confessions rule, which 
renders inadmissible any statement by an accused person to a person in 
authority unless the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the statement was obtained voluntarily.23 The confessions rule has 
formed a part of the common law of evidence since the 18th century.24 At 
the time of its emergence and for much of its history, the rule was 
understood to be rooted primarily, if not exclusively, in concerns about 
the reliability of coerced confessions.25 In the Charter era, however, the 
Supreme Court has declared that the confessions rule is grounded in the 
principle against self-incrimination.26 
In other areas too, legal rules that developed for seemingly inde-
pendent reasons have come to be regarded as embodiments of the 
principle against self-incrimination. In R. v. Stinchcombe,27 the Supreme 
Court recognized the Crown’s duty to disclose evidence to the defence 
before trial as a protection of the right to make full answer and defence 
under section 7 of the Charter; at the same time, the Court preserved the 
pre-existing rule that the defence has no reciprocal duty to disclose its 
case to the Crown.28 No reference was made to self-incrimination in 
Stinchcombe, but the absence of a defence duty to disclose has since been 
interpreted as a reflection of the principle against self-incrimination.29 
Similarly, the rule prohibiting the Crown from reopening its case once 
the defence has opened its own case has been confirmed and strength-
ened under the Charter on the basis of the principle against self-
incrimination.30 The Crown has but one chance to bring its case to meet, 
and to allow it to adjust that case once the defence has started to respond 
would “jeopardiz[e], indirectly, the principle that an accused not be 
                                                                                                             
23 R. v. Hodgson, [1998] S.C.J. No. 66, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 449, at para. 12 (S.C.C.) [hereinaf-
ter “Hodgson”]. 
24 John H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2003), at 220-21. 
25 Hodgson, supra, note 23, at para. 17. For a case exemplifying this view, see R. v. Wray, 
[1970] S.C.J. No. 80, [1971] S.C.R. 272 (S.C.C.). 
26 R.J.S., supra, note 12 (while it does not capture the historical origins of the rule, the 
proposition that “the confessions rule is grounded in a principle against self-incrimination ... is true 
in a modern sense”: at para. 75). 
27 [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Stinchcombe”]. 
28 Id., at 333. 
29 M.B.P., supra, note 7, at para. 38. 
30 Id. 
(2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) THE PRINCIPLE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 247 
conscripted against him- or herself”.31 Even when the pre-trial right to 
silence under section 7 was recognized in R. v. Hebert,32 McLachlin J. 
went only so far as to say the newly minted right was “related” to the 
narrow testimonial “privilege” against self-incrimination.33 In later cases, 
the right to silence has come to be viewed as a central manifestation of 
the broad principle against self-incrimination.34 These examples demon-
strate that the principle against self-incrimination operates as a unifying 
theme linking a disparate set of procedural and evidentiary rules. 
Historically, at least, these “rules were not derived from the principle[; i]t 
was the other way around”.35 
This is not to suggest that the section 7 principle against self-
incrimination is infertile. New legal protections have been derived from 
the principle. For example, based on the observation that section 13 use 
immunity for prior compelled testimony would be ineffective without it, 
the Supreme Court has recognized that section 7 of the Charter grounds 
“derivative use immunity” for evidence (such as physical evidence) 
discovered as a result of the prior compelled testimony.36 Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court has recognized that the principle against self-
incrimination demands that individuals be exempted from being com-
pelled to testify where the authorities seek to compel a witness to testify 
in formal proceedings for the “predominant purpose” of obtaining 
incriminating evidence against the witness.37 Finally, the section 7 
principle against self-incrimination has been used to ground protection 
against the use of statutorily compelled statements. In R. v. White,38 
motor vehicle accident reports made under compulsion of a provincial 
statute could not be used against the accused in criminal proceedings. 
In sum, the principle against self-incrimination has emerged as an 
organizing idea that structures and informs a variety of procedural 
safeguards. Some of those safeguards pre-dated the section 7 principle 
against self-incrimination; others emanate from that principle. There 
remains a possibility that in future, further procedural protections will be 
drawn out of the constitutional principle against self-incrimination. 
                                                                                                             
31 Id., at para. 41. 
32 R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hebert”]. 
33 Id., at paras. 20, 47 and 50. 
34 R.J.S., supra, note 12, at para. 93. 
35 Id., at para. 76. 
36 British Columbia (Securities Commission) v. Branch, [1995] S.C.J. No. 32, [1995] 2 
S.C.R. 3, at para. 5 (S.C.C.). 
37 Id., at para. 7. 
38 White, supra, note 7. 
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However, such developments appear to have slowed in recent years 
and there are indications that the Supreme Court may have retreated 
somewhat from its embrace of the principle. For instance, in upholding 
the constitutional validity of compulsion to testify in investigative 
hearings related to terrorism, a majority of the Court described the 
principle as grounding only “three procedural safeguards ...: use immu-
nity, derivative use immunity, and constitutional exemption”.39 And in R. 
v. B. (S.A.),40 the full Court ruled that the section 7 principle against self-
incrimination was not engaged by the DNA warrant powers in the 
Criminal Code.41 While it is difficult to argue with the Court’s conclu-
sion that this finely crafted scheme involving prior authorization was 
more appropriately assessed under the section 8 protection against 
unreasonable search and seizure, in so ruling the Court adopted language 
that seemed to disparage the principle against self-incrimination itself.42 
That principle, once described as “the single most important organizing 
principle in criminal law”,43 was diminished to a principle of “limited 
scope”.44 
3. Rationales for the Principle 
The principle against self-incrimination has been justified on a num-
ber of grounds. Two of the principal justifications centre on the conse-
quences that might flow if the state could freely compel self-
incrimination. First, it is argued that coerced statements by the accused 
would likely be unreliable.45 On this view, the principle against self-
incrimination promotes accuracy in adjudication by guarding against the 
admission and use of unreliable evidence.46 Second, compulsory self-
                                                                                                             
39 Re Application under s. 83.23 of the Criminal Code, [2004] S.C.J. No. 40, [2004] 2 
S.C.R. 248, at para. 70 (S.C.C.). 
40 [2003] S.C.J. No. 61, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 678 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “S.A.B.”]. 
41 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
42 See David Stratas, “R. v. B. (S.A.) and the Right Against Self-Incrimination: A Confusing 
Change of Direction” Case Comment (2004) 14 C.R. (6th) 227. 
43 M.B.P., supra, note 7, at para. 36. 
44 S.A.B., supra, note 40, at para. 57. See also R. v. Grant, [2009] S.C.J. No. 32, [2009] 2 
S.C.R. 353 (S.C.C.) (reconfiguring the analysis of exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence 
under s. 24(2) in a way that places less emphasis on whether the evidence was conscripted and 
discarding the law’s former “assumption that the use of conscriptive evidence always, or almost 
always, renders the trial unfair”: at para. 65). 
45 See, e.g., White, supra, note 7 (one of the two key purposes of the principle is “to protect 
against unreliable confessions”: at para. 43). 
46 See, e.g., Hamish Stewart, “The Confessions Rule and the Charter” (2009) 54 McGill L.J. 
517 [hereinafter “Stewart, ‘The Confessions Rule’”]; Steven Penney, “What’s Wrong with Self-
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incrimination is associated with inhumane investigative tactics and 
invasions of privacy.47 In this respect the principle against self-
incrimination acts as a check on state abuses of power.48 
Beyond these consequentialist concerns, the courts and commenta-
tors have recognized a normative dimension to the principle against self-
incrimination. The right not to be compelled to incriminate oneself 
exists, at least in part, because we think individuals ought to have 
freedom of choice on the matter of whether to cooperate with authori-
ties.49 This normative claim has been supported by reference to the 
sovereignty, autonomy, dignity and privacy of the individual.50 More-
over, in light of the presumption of innocence and the imbalance of 
power between the state and the individual accused, justice seems to 
require that the state bring its case without compelling the cooperation of 
the accused.51 
Normative arguments in favour of the principle against self-
incrimination have not attracted universal support. An undercurrent of 
dissent has developed against the idea that individuals ought, in princi-
ple, to be free to choose whether to respond to state accusations. In his 
exhaustive study of self-incrimination law in Canada, Steven Penney 
argued that compulsory self-incrimination was not necessarily objection-
able.52 As Penney and others have observed, it does not seem inconsistent 
with ordinary moral principles to require individuals to respond to well-
founded accusations of misconduct.53 Therefore, Penney posited, if 
adequate grounds for suspicion existed against the suspect and controls 
were put in place to prevent abusive treatment and ensure evidentiary 
                                                                                                             
Incrimination? The Wayward Path of Self-Incrimination Law in the Post-Charter Era: Part I: 
Justifications for Rules Preventing Self-Incrimination” (2003) 48 Crim. L.Q. 249, at 250, 253-54 
[hereinafter “Penney, ‘Justifications’”]. 
47 See especially Penney, “Justifications”, id., at 250, 254-56. 
48 See, e.g., White, supra, note 7 (the other key purposes of the principle is “to protect 
against abuses of power by the state”: at para. 43). 
49 See especially Penney, “Justifications”, supra, note 46, at 250. 
50 See especially White, supra, note 7, at para. 43. See also R.J.S., supra, note 12 (the “prin-
ciple of sovereignty ... [requires] that individuals should be left alone in the absence of justification, 
and not conscripted by the state to promote a self-defeating purpose”: at para. 81); Stewart, “The 
Confessions Rule”, supra, note 46 (respect for human dignity entails protection against self-
incrimination because “to force a suspect or an accused person to testify in support of the state’s case 
against him or her would be to treat this person as a mere means to the state’s objectives”). 
51 For example, M.B.P., supra, note 7, at paras. 37, 40. 
52 Penney, “Justifications”, supra, note 46. 
53 See id., at 257-58, and the sources cited therein. 
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reliability, the state could be justified in compelling an answer to a 
criminal accusation.54 
Notwithstanding the questions raised about the moral status of free 
choice in this context, the fact remains that our legal system reflects “a 
basic distaste for self-conscription”.55 Moreover, it is no accident that, 
historically, the privilege against self-incrimination became established 
in English common law in the late 18th century, when the theory of the 
trial as an opportunity for the defence to test the prosecution’s case was 
born.56 The norms of modern adversary criminal trials, including the 
burden of proof on the Crown and the presumption of innocence, entail 
some version of the principle against self-incrimination. Whatever doubts 
may surround the ultimate justification for the suspect’s freedom to 
choose whether to cooperate with authorities, that choice appears 
justified at least in the historically contingent sense that it follows from 
the normative logic of our theory of the trial.57 
Ultimately, questioning whether suspects ought to have a choice 
about whether to cooperate with authorities may be beside the point. The 
principle against self-incrimination, as it exists today, requires that 
suspects’ choices be protected, either because free choice is a moral right, 
because it protects suspects from abuse, because it offers some assurance 
of evidentiary reliability, or, more likely, for some combination of 
reasons. From a doctrinal point of view, the difficult question is not 
whether suspects ought to have a choice but what choice means.58 Under 
what conditions is a suspect’s choice to incriminate herself valid? What 
kinds of state action represent an unjustifiable interference with that 
choice? On these fundamental questions, Canadian law remains trou-
blingly inconsistent. 
                                                                                                             
54 Id., at 250. For a similar view from an American perspective, see Albert W. Alschuler, 
“A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective” in R.H. Helmholz et al., eds., The Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination: Its Origins and Development (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997) 181 
(“[a] suspect’s answers to orderly questions in a safeguarded courtroom environment should not be 
regarded as the product of compulsion”: at 204). 
55 R.J.S., supra, note 12, at para. 83. 
56 See John H. Langbein, “The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
at Common Law” (1994) 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1047, at 1048. 
57 See Paciocco, “Removing the Coffin Nails”, supra, note 1 (the principle against self-
incrimination “is an indispensable corollary of the principle of a case to meet which helps to define 
the accusatorial system which, in turn, exists in order to vindicate the rule of law”: at 103). 
58 See, e.g., Stewart, “The Confessions Rule”, supra, note 46; Michael Plaxton, “An Analy-
sis and Defence of Free Choice Theory: A Response to Professor Penney” (1999) 27 C.R. (5th) 218. 
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III. FREE CHOICE AND COMPULSION 
The principle against self-incrimination has nothing to say about 
self-incrimination that is the product of a free choice on the part of the 
suspect. The principle prohibits self-incrimination that is compelled. The 
notion of compulsion or coercion thus plays a central role in defining the 
scope of the principle. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
the problem of compulsion has been erratic. The Court’s failure to 
maintain a clear and consistent approach to compulsion has created 
discrepancies in the safeguards against self-incrimination in Canadian 
law. 
1. Constraints on the Compulsion Analysis 
Two constraints on the Court’s analysis of compulsion should be ac-
knowledged at the outset. First, to some extent, the “mishmash”59 quality 
of protections against compelled self-incrimination in Canada reflects 
real differences between the contexts to which the overarching principle 
applies. For example, state compulsion to testify in formal proceedings 
(through the use of subpoenas and the threat of contempt proceedings) 
looks very different from compulsion to give a statement in the context 
of police interrogation (which might involve threats or intimidation). In 
light of the varied contexts in which the principle against self-
incrimination applies, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the 
“principle may demand different things at different times.”60 This 
sensitivity to context makes a uniform approach to compulsion — or to 
self-incrimination issues generally — unattainable. 
Second, as a practical matter, safeguards against self-incrimination 
cannot be too categorical because effective law enforcement frequently 
depends on the authorities’ ability to induce suspects to incriminate 
themselves by offering confessions or pleading guilty.61 An overly 
expansive notion of compulsion in the self-incrimination context would 
interfere with the state’s legitimate interest in influencing individuals to 
                                                                                                             
59 Lee Stuesser, “R. v. S.A.B.: Putting Self-Incrimination in Context” Case Comment (2004) 
42 Alta. L. Rev. 543. 
60 For example, R.J.S., supra, note 12, at para. 97. See also White, supra, note 7, at para. 45. 
61 For example, Tim Quigley, Procedure in Canadian Criminal Law, 2d ed., loose-leaf 
(consulted on February 15, 2012) (Toronto: Carswell, 2005), ch. 7 (while the principle against self-
incrimination “is deeply entrenched ..., the relatively smooth functioning of our criminal justice 
system is very dependent upon accused persons ... pleading guilty ... [or] actually incriminating 
themselves and thereby assisting in the proof of the allegation”: at 5). 
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incriminate themselves. The Supreme Court has recently emphasized the 
importance of maintaining a balance between defensive safeguard and 
law enforcement interests in the self-incrimination context. As Charron J. 
held for a majority of the Court in R. v. Singh,62 “[p]rovided that the 
detainee’s rights are adequately protected, including the freedom to 
choose whether to speak or not, it is in society’s interest that the police 
attempt to tap this valuable source.”63 The difficulty, of course, lies in 
locating the line between influence and coercion; between compelling 
self-incrimination and using “legitimate means of persuasion”64 to 
encourage self-incrimination. 
2. The Uncertain Notion of Compulsion 
Recognizing that a workable approach to compulsion in the law of 
self-incrimination can be neither uniform nor overbroad, it remains to be 
considered what such an approach should look like. The central role 
played by the idea of compulsion in separating permissible from imper-
missible self-incrimination arguably grounds two conclusions about how 
self-incrimination law should be structured. First, compulsion should be 
the focus. Any analysis of a self-incrimination issue that loses sight of 
the distinction between compulsion and choice has gone astray. Second, 
while the approach to compulsion must be contextually sensitive, one 
might expect to find some coherence to the concept of compulsion across 
contexts. At the very least, one would hope that problems of compulsory 
self-incrimination would be treated similarly in contexts that are, in fact, 
similar. Principled variation across factually dissimilar contexts should 
be expected; arbitrary variation in factually similar contexts should be 
avoided. 
Measuring the Canadian law of self-incrimination against these stan-
dards yields mixed results. At times, self-incrimination law has lost its 
focus on compulsion. For instance, for two decades after it first consid-
ered the provision in R. v. Dubois,65 the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
on section 13 use immunity descended into a morass of difficult distinc-
tions between permissible and impermissible uses of prior testimony. The 
Court repeatedly affirmed that section 13 was engaged when the prior 
                                                                                                             
62 [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 405, at para. 45 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Singh”]. 
63 Id., at para. 45. 
64 Hebert, supra, note 32, at para. 53. 
65 Supra, note 19. 
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testimony was used to incriminate the accused, but not when the testi-
mony was used to impeach the accused’s credibility.66 The distinction 
between incrimination and impeachment was unsustainable in this 
context because, realistically, all uses of prior testimony against an 
accused are incriminating.67 In R. v. Henry,68 the full Court changed 
course on section 13 and jettisoned the distinction between impeachment 
and incrimination. Henry established that section 13 prevents prior 
testimony from being used against the accused for any purpose whenever 
that prior testimony is compelled. The case advanced the interpretation of 
section 13 by refocusing the analysis on the question of compulsion. 
With respect to the meaning of compulsion generally, Canadian law 
on self-incrimination appears disappointingly incoherent. The Supreme 
Court has propounded a range of divergent views on the limits of 
compulsion in the self-incrimination context. Consider the following 
proposition, initially advanced by Lamer C.J.C. in dissent and later 
adopted by the full Court: 
Any state action that coerces an individual to furnish evidence against 
him- or herself in a proceeding in which the individual and the state are 
adversaries violates the principle against self-incrimination. Coercion, 
it should be noted, means the denial of free and informed consent.69 
On this view, which was stated broadly without any apparent limitation 
as to context, any deception on the part of state agents would vitiate the 
suspect’s free and informed choice and render any resulting self-
incrimination coerced. Such an expansive notion of coercion is impossi-
ble to square with much of the Court’s jurisprudence on confessions, 
which holds, for example, that deceiving a suspect into thinking the 
evidence against him is overwhelming is a legitimate interrogation tactic 
that normally will not render a resulting statement involuntary.70 
Within narrower doctrinal contexts, the Court has had varying levels 
of success in maintaining a consistent definition of compulsion. The law 
                                                                                                             
66 R. v. Kuldip, [1990] S.C.J. No. 126, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 618 (S.C.C.); R. v. Noel, [2002] 
S.C.J. No. 68, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 433 (S.C.C.). 
67 For example, Hamish Stewart, “Henry in the Supreme Court of Canada: Reorienting the 
s. 13 Right against Self-Incrimination” (2006) 34 C.R. (6th) 112, at 115. 
68 Henry, supra, note 19. 
69 Jones, supra, note 18, at para. 29 (emphasis added), Lamer C.J.C. dissenting, cited with 
approval in S.A.B., supra, note 40, at para. 59, and R. v. Brown, [2002] S.C.J. No. 35, [2002] 2 
S.C.R. 185, at para. 92 (S.C.C.). 
70 See, e.g., R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Oickle”] (“the tactic of inflating the reliability of incriminating evidence is a common, and generally 
unobjectionable one”: at para. 2). 
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has been admirably consistent, for example, on the meaning of compul-
sion where the law obliges the accused to speak. It is clear that a legal 
requirement to testify in formal proceedings amounts to per se compul-
sion for the self-incrimination analysis.71 The Court’s conclusion in 
White that the section 7 principle against self-incrimination grounds use 
immunity for statutorily compelled statements72 accords nicely with the 
idea of compulsion that applies to formal testimony. Whether as a 
compellable witness in formal proceedings or as the maker of an obliga-
tory statement under provincial law, the Supreme Court has consistently 
taken the view that an individual under a legal obligation to make a 
statement is thereby compelled to do so for the purposes of the self-
incrimination analysis. By contrast, as we will see, glaring inconsisten-
cies have developed in the Supreme Court’s approach to distinguishing 
compulsion from persuasion where an individual makes a statement to 
police in the absence of any legal requirement to do so. 
IV. SELF-INCRIMINATION IN UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS 
The patchwork quality of self-incrimination law can perhaps best be 
observed in the context of statements to police. The existing rules against 
compulsory self-incrimination in this context — chiefly the section 7 
pre-trial right to silence and the confessions rule — provide meaningful 
protection, but the limited scope of those rules means that they do not 
apply to undercover operations outside of detention. Consequently, such 
undercover operations and the self-incriminating statements that emerge 
from them are subject to little or no judicial oversight or restraint. The 
largely unregulated status of statements made to undercover police raises 
serious concerns about self-incrimination. In this section, the Mr. Big 
strategy will be offered as an example of a potentially coercive under-
cover tactic designed to extract confessions. 
1. The Gap in the Existing Self-Incrimination Protections 
The two principal protections against self-incrimination that apply 
when individuals make statements to police are the common law confes-
                                                                                                             
71 For example, Henry, supra, note 19 (“evidence of compellable witnesses should be 
treated as compelled even if their attendance was not enforced by a subpoena”: at para. 34). 
72 White, supra, note 7 (such a statement is compelled where the individual makes it “on the 
basis of an honest and reasonably held belief that he or she was required by law to [do so]”: at para. 75). 
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sions rule and the section 7 pre-trial right to silence.73 As noted above, 
the confessions rule holds that a statement made by an accused person to 
a person in authority is inadmissible against the accused unless the 
Crown proves voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.74 The law 
defines a “person in authority” for the purposes of the confessions rule as 
an individual who the accused reasonably believes is involved in her 
detention or the proceedings against her.75 The confessions rule thus 
applies to ordinary police interrogations where the accused knows she is 
dealing with police,76 but not to undercover operations.77 The question 
whether a confession was voluntarily obtained is decided by reference to 
a range of factors that shed light on whether, in all the circumstances, the 
accused’s will was overborne.78 Voluntariness can be vitiated where the 
authorities make threats or promises, where the circumstances of the 
interrogation are oppressive, where the suspect lacks an operating mind, 
or for some combination of these reasons.79 In addition, the confessions 
rule mandates a “distinct inquiry” into whether the tactics used by police 
would shock the conscience of the community; if they would, the 
confession should be excluded on that ground alone.80 
The section 7 pre-trial right to silence was recognized in R. v. 
Hebert,81 a case involving an undercover operation. The accused had 
been arrested for robbery and, after consulting with counsel, he told 
police that he did not wish to make a statement. Police then placed him 
in a cell with an undercover officer, who engaged the accused in conver-
sation and elicited incriminating statements from him. Justice McLach-
lin, writing for the majority, found that section 7 protected the accused’s 
right to silence before trial, which “secures to the detained person the 
right to make a free and meaningful choice as to whether to speak to the 
authorities or to remain silent”.82 On the facts, the police violated the 
accused’s right to silence when they “us[ed] a trick to negate his decision 
                                                                                                             
73 The s. 10(b) right to counsel also provides some protection against self-incrimination in 
this context: see supra, notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 
74 See supra, note 23, and accompanying text. 
75 Hodgson, supra, note 23, at paras. 32-34. 
76 Oickle, supra, note 70 (the confessions rule concerns “common law limits on police 
interrogation”: at para. 1). 
77 R. v. Grandinetti, [2005] S.C.J. No. 3, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 27 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Grandi-
netti”] (undercover officer not a “person in authority”: at para. 40). 
78 Oickle, supra, note 70, at para. 57; Singh, supra, note 62, at para. 36. 
79 Oickle, id., at paras. 47-64, 68-71. 
80 Id., at paras. 65-67. 
81 Hebert, supra, note 32. 
82 Id., at para. 67. 
256 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
not to speak”.83 The idea that police trickery may negate a suspect’s 
freedom of choice and violate the right to silence appears to cast doubt 
on the constitutionality of undercover operations generally. However, the 
Court in Hebert recognized four limitations that curtail the scope of the 
section 7 pre-trial right to silence: the right does not prevent police 
questioning an accused after counsel has been retained, it applies only 
after detention, it does not apply to statements made voluntarily to 
cellmates, and it applies only where state agents actively elicit the self-
incriminating statements.84 
Broadly speaking, both the confessions rule and the right to silence 
are concerned with protecting the accused from being compelled to speak 
to police. These doctrines are plainly inconsistent, however, in terms of 
the way compulsion is understood. The confessions rule demands a 
complex balancing of factors to determine whether the accused’s 
statements were, in all the circumstances, voluntary. Out of deference to 
society’s interest in effective law enforcement, the courts have been 
careful to interpret voluntariness in a way that preserves the ability of 
police to use some tricks and pressure tactics to persuade suspects to 
confess.85 For example, the Supreme Court has recently upheld the 
voluntariness of statements made after police used each of the following 
tactics: falsely claiming that the suspect’s DNA has been discovered at 
the crime scene;86 representing a polygraph test that allegedly implicated 
the suspect as “infallible”;87 and refusing to let the suspect see his 
girlfriend until he “cleaned his slate” by confessing.88 The section 7 right 
to silence as recognized in Hebert seems to rely on a very different view 
of the line between free choice and compulsion. If an undercover officer 
engaging a detainee in conversation about the crime is enough to negate 
the detainee’s freedom of choice, then any deception on the part of police 
might amount to compulsion.89 
                                                                                                             
83 Id., at para. 81. 
84 Id., at paras. 73-76. See also R. v. Broyles, [1991] S.C.J. No. 95, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 595 
(S.C.C.). 
85 See e.g., Oickle, supra, note 70 (“courts must remember that the police may often offer 
some kind of inducement to the suspect to obtain a confession”: at para. 57); Don Stuart, “Oickle: 
The Supreme Court’s Recipe for Coercive Interrogation” (2001) 36 C.R. (5th) 188. 
86 Sinclair, supra, note 21, at para. 116. 
87 Oickle, supra, note 70, at para. 94. 
88 R. v. Spencer, [2007] S.C.J. No. 11, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 8 (S.C.C.). 
89 See Tim Quigley, “Principled Reform of Criminal Procedure” in Don Stuart, R.J. Delisle 
& Allan Manson, Towards a Clear and Just Criminal Law: A Criminal Reports Forum (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1999) 253 (“it is time to take measures against police lying which, after all, is another 
means of overcoming a suspect’s choice of whether or not to speak to authorities”: at 292). 
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The Supreme Court discussed the relationship between the section 7 
pre-trial right to silence and the confessions rule in Singh.90 That case 
involved a detained murder suspect who was interrogated by individuals 
he knew were police. In the course of the interrogation, Singh asserted 
his right to remain silent 18 times before ultimately responding to police 
questions with some self-incriminating statements. The defence objected 
to the admissibility of Singh’s statements on the basis that they were 
obtained in violation of his section 7 right to silence, but a slim majority 
of the Supreme Court rejected this argument. The majority held that, 
where a detainee is interrogated by known police, the section 7 right to 
silence is subsumed into the voluntariness inquiry.91 Since the trial judge 
had considered all the circumstances and determined that the statements 
were made voluntarily, the question whether the accused’s free will was 
overborne had already been answered and the section 7 right to silence 
could provide no further protection.92 
The majority judgment in Singh provoked a strong dissent and has 
proven unpopular with commentators because it arguably undermines the 
right to silence to give no effect to a suspect’s repeated assertions of that 
right.93 This author has elsewhere argued that while it might have been 
better for the Supreme Court to recognize a stronger right to silence, 
there are advantages to relying on the multi-dimensional confessions rule 
as the principal protection for interrogated suspects.94 For present 
purposes, it is important to note that Singh has created some incoherence 
in the idea of compulsion under the section 7 right to silence. Where a 
detainee who has asserted the right to silence is approached by an 
undercover “cell plant”, as in Hebert, this mild form of deception will 
negate the detainee’s choice. On the other hand, where a detainee is 
interrogated by known police, as in Singh, the problem of compulsion 
will collapse into the voluntary confessions rule, which leaves ample 
room for police pressure and deceit. 
                                                                                                             
90 Supra, note 62. 
91 Id., at para. 39. 
92 Id., at paras. 50-53. 
93 See id. (“[w]hat is at stake ... is the Court’s duty to ensure that a detainee’s right to si-
lence will be respected by interrogators once it has been unequivocally asserted”: at para. 57), Fish 
J., dissenting. For commentary, see e.g., Don Stuart, Annotation (2007) 51 C.R. (6th) 201; Dale E. 
Ives & Christopher Sherrin, “R. v. Singh — A Meaningless Right to Silence with Dangerous 
Consequences” (2007) 51 C.R. (6th) 250. 
94 Lisa Dufraimont, “The Interrogation Trilogy and the Protections for Interrogated Sus-
pects in Canadian Law” (2011) 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 309. 
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Admittedly, the doctrinal limits on the confessions rule and the sec-
tion 7 pre-trial right to silence were created with a view to managing the 
problem of compulsion. Hebert limited the right to silence to the deten-
tion context because, outside detention, the suspect “is not in the control 
of the state”.95 The person in authority requirement exists because the 
confessions rule is specifically concerned with the ways in which police 
might abuse their authority when suspects see them as capable of 
influencing their fate.96 One cannot dispute that both detention and 
interrogation by known police raise special and, arguably, heightened 
concerns about coercion. However, it hardly follows that coercion issues 
are not in play when police interact with suspects undercover or outside 
of the context of detention.97 Unfortunately, the interplay between the 
confessions rule and the section 7 pre-trial right to silence creates an 
apparent gap in the law: no existing rule seems to protect suspects who 
are not detained from being compelled to incriminate themselves in 
interactions with undercover police. 
2. The “Mr. Big” Problem 
This gap has raised problems in cases involving an increasingly 
common and controversial undercover police technique known as the 
“Mr. Big” strategy. Typically, the scenario unfolds as follows.98 One or 
more undercover officers befriend the suspect and introduce him or her 
into a fictitious criminal organization. The suspect begins to “work” for 
the organization, often receiving generous compensation for petty tasks 
like delivering packages or counting money. Promises of large financial 
payouts in the future are held out to entice suspects to deepen their 
involvement in the organization. Scenarios are also created to impress on 
suspects that the organization will not tolerate any dishonesty or disloy-
alty; beatings or even a killing might be staged to demonstrate the violent 
                                                                                                             
95 Hebert, supra, note 32, at para. 74. 
96 Hodgson, supra, note 23 (“it is the fear of reprisal or hope of leniency that persons in 
authority may hold out and which is associated with their official status that may render a statement 
involuntary”: at para. 24). 
97 See Patrick Healy, “The Right to Remain Silent: Value Added, But How Much?”(1990) 
77 C.R. (3d) 199, at 200. 
98 This summary of the technique draws on the more detailed discussions in Timothy E. 
Moore, Peter Copeland & Regina A. Schuller, “Deceit, Betrayal and the Search for Truth: Legal and 
Psychological Perspectives on the ‘Mr. Big’ Strategy” (2009) 55 Crim. L.Q. 348, at 351-57, 
[hereinafter “Moore, Copeland & Schuller”] and Kouri T. Keenan & Joan Brockman, Mr. Big: 
Exposing Undercover Operations in Canada (Black Point, N.S.: Fernwood, 2010), at 19-21 
[hereinafter “Keenan & Brockman”]. 
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response one should expect for lying to the leaders of the organization. 
At some point, the suspect will be introduced to a leader — “Mr. Big” — 
who will press the suspect to admit involvement in some prior crime. 
Various reasons might be given for the demand for the confession: for 
example, that the organization needs information about its members’ 
illegal activities as “insurance” to guarantee loyalty, or that the organiza-
tion can use its police connections to derail an ongoing investigation 
against the suspect. Mr. Big operations are time-consuming and expen-
sive — often they go on for months and involve dozens of officers — so 
they tend to be used to obtain confessions only in high-priority cases. 
Mr. Big operations raise obvious self-incrimination problems. Every 
one of the policy concerns underlying the principle against self-
incrimination is clearly engaged. Concerns about the abuse of official 
authority appear grave where the state itself lures an individual into a life 
of crime and makes the individual fearful for his personal safety, all to 
the end of obtaining a confession to be used in his prosecution. The 
imbalance of resources between the Crown and the accused is also 
evident in the Mr. Big cases. Finally, the reliability of a confession given 
to Mr. Big can be suspect for at least three reasons: suspects may 
perceive that there is no downside to falsely confessing guilt to individu-
als who are themselves criminals, suspects may capitulate out of fear of 
the harm that may come to them if they disobey Mr. Big, and suspects 
may be too tempted by the social and financial rewards that come with 
moving up in the organization to risk falling into disfavour by refusing 
Mr. Big’s demand for a confession.99 No empirical research exists — nor 
could any be ethically conducted — to speak directly to the question 
whether Mr. Big confessions are diagnostic of actual guilt.100 But given 
the coercive tactics involved, a fear of false confessions in this context 
appears entirely well-founded. 
Nevertheless, because of the gap between the confessions rule and 
the section 7 pre-trial right to silence, it is difficult to find a doctrinal 
basis in Canadian law to sustain an objection to the admissibility of a 
confession arising from the Mr. Big scenario.101 Various approaches have 
                                                                                                             
99 See especially Moore, Copeland & Schuller, id., at 378-83. See also Steven M. Smith, 
Veronica Stinson & Marc W. Patry, “Using the ‘Mr. Big’ Technique to Elicit Confessions: 
Successful Innovation or Dangerous Development in the Canadian Legal System?” (2009) 15 
Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 168 (“the motivation to confess is overwhelming and ... the drawbacks of 
doing so are nearly non-existent”: at 181). 
100 Moore, Copeland & Schuller, id., at 392. 
101 See especially the discussion of these doctrines in R. v. Osmar, [2007] O.J. No. 244, 217 
C.C.C. (3d) 174 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Osmar”]. 
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been suggested, including excluding Mr. Big confessions on reliability 
grounds under the principled approach to hearsay and staying proceed-
ings where the Mr. Big operation amounts to an abuse of process.102 
Overwhelmingly, however, courts have rejected these arguments, 
admitted such confessions and left any reliability issues to be considered 
by the trier of fact.103 
A few courts have recently suggested that confessions arising from 
more extreme versions of the Mr. Big strategy might be excluded 
because the police conduct could be considered shocking to the con-
science of the community.104 The community shock test was initially 
articulated by Lamer J. in his concurring judgment in the pre-Charter 
case of R. v. Rothman,105 and was later adopted as a discrete inquiry 
linked to voluntariness in R. v. Oickle.106 Community shock is a high 
threshold and few tactics meet the test; moreover, the existing cases 
support the view that, generally, the test will not be met in the Mr. Big 
context.107 Still, building on the community shock test constitutes, at 
present, one promising avenue for developing some existing legal rule 
into a check on the Mr. Big strategy. On the other hand, resort to a 
doctrine that was developed pre-Charter and has barely been used since 
arguably bespeaks a level of desperation in the courts’ effort to find some 
doctrinal basis on which challenges to the admissibility of Mr. Big 
confessions might conceivably proceed. 
The struggle to find a doctrine to place some restraint on Mr. Big 
operations raises a fundamental question. What good is a constitutional 
principle against self-incrimination that does not apply where the state 
exploits its overwhelming resources to wage a relentless and intrusive 
                                                                                                             
102 Attempts to challenge the admissibility of Mr. Big confessions using the principled ap-
proach to hearsay have generally been unsuccessful because, as a species of admissions, the 
prevailing view holds that confessions are not subject to the necessity and reliability analysis: 
Moore, Copeland & Schuller, supra, note 98, at 360-67. In one Mr. Big case, the Supreme Court 
held that “admissibility of such statements is filtered through exclusionary doctrines like abuse of 
process”: Grandinetti, supra, note 77, at para. 36. However, a stay of proceedings for abuse of 
process under s. 7 of the Charter is considered a drastic remedy that should only be ordered in the 
“clearest of cases”: R. v. Regan, [2002] S.C.J. No. 14, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297, at para. 53 (S.C.C.). 
Perhaps it is unsurprising that abuse of process doctrine has not frequently been taken up in the Mr. 
Big cases: see Keenan & Brockman, supra, note 98, at 69-75. 
103 Moore, Copeland & Schuller, id., at 357. 
104 See R. v. Earhart, [2011] B.C.J. No. 2286, 90 C.R. (6th) 238, at para. 84 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. 
Bonisteel, [2008] B.C.J. No. 1705, 236 C.C.C. (3d) 170, at para. 93 (B.C.C.A.); Osmar, supra, note 
101, at para. 48. 
105 [1981] S.C.J. No. 55, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.). 
106 See supra, note 80, and accompanying text. 
107 Moore, Copeland & Schuller, supra, note 98, at 367-68. 
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campaign of deception to manipulate, bribe and terrify an individual into 
complying with its demands for a confession to a serious crime? Argua-
bly there are good reasons to confine the confessions rule to statements 
made to persons in authority. The rich and complex voluntariness 
analysis has clearly been developed with the ordinary police interroga-
tion context in mind. There may also be good reasons to limit the section 
7 pre-trial right to silence in the form recognized in Hebert to the specific 
context of detention. Wide application of the Hebert rule, with its 
stringent notion of free choice and intolerance for police deception, 
would outlaw most undercover operations. But if no existing legal rule 
applies to Mr. Big operations, surely the overarching principle against 
self-incrimination demands that some new safeguard be created. After 
all, filling gaps between specific rules is what residual constitutional 
principles are for. 
In R. v. Hart,108 an important judgment released as this volume went 
to press, the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador (Court of 
Appeal) relied on the principle against self-incrimination to quash the 
convictions of a man who had been convicted of murdering his two 
young daughters. The convictions were based almost entirely on the 
statements of the accused to undercover officers in a Mr. Big operation. 
A majority of the Court found that undercover operatives used psycho-
logical coercion to extract a confession from the poor and socially 
isolated accused by offering him friends, money, a lavish lifestyle and a 
sense of community over a period of months. Writing for the majority, 
Green C.J. reasoned that “if forced to choose between telling the truth 
and keeping his friends, lifestyle, and income ... there was a strong 
likelihood that, even if he was innocent, he would lie”.109 Chief Justice 
Green held that Hebert’s limitation of the section 7 right to silence to the 
detention context should be loosened so that the right to silence would 
apply where, as here, the suspect was otherwise under the control of the 
state.110 However, the majority ruled that, even if the section 7 right to 
silence could not be extended in that way, the accused’s section 7 rights 
were breached on the basis of the “broader principle against self-
incrimination”.111 Should this case proceed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada, one might hope that further light may be shed on the application 
of the principle in the context of undercover operations. 
                                                                                                             
108 R. v. Hart, [2012] N.J. No. 303, 2012 NLCA 61 (N.L.C.A.). 
109 Id., at para. 207. 
110 Id., at para. 199. 
111 Id., at para. 246. 
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A case could be made for prohibiting Mr. Big tactics entirely, but the 
more modest aim of the present analysis is to show that such operations 
should receive some judicial oversight. The principle against self-
incrimination minimally demands that confessions arising from Mr. Big 
operations be subjected to an individualized analysis of whether, in all 
the circumstances, the police crossed the line from persuasion to coer-
cion. Ultimately, the Mr. Big problem reveals the extent to which, 
notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s recognition of the principle against 
self-incrimination under the Charter, self-incrimination law in Canada 
continues to be understood as a patchwork assortment of discrete proce-
dural protections. Overcoming this tendency might move the law closer 
to solving the Mr. Big conundrum and vindicating the residual protection 
promised by the constitutional principle against self-incrimination. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Charter effected a revolution in Canadian self-incrimination 
law, but that revolution remains contested and incomplete. One can 
hardly overstate the significance of the emergence of the overarching 
principle against self-incrimination under section 7 and the specific rules 
that spring from that principle. Nevertheless, as this analysis has shown, 
the Supreme Court’s commitment to the principle has sometimes 
appeared to waver and its analysis of what constitutes compulsion has 
been variable. Consequently, the existing protections against compulsory 
self-incrimination retain the haphazard quality that characterized self-
incrimination law in the pre-Charter era. For instance, the doctrinal gap 
between the confessions rule and the section 7 pre-trial right to silence 
has created a legal situation which, practically speaking, permits the state 
to compel suspects to incriminate themselves in undercover operations. If 
the overarching principle against self-incrimination remains a vital part 
of our Charter jurisprudence, this state of affairs should not be allowed to 
stand. Time will tell if the patchwork principle against self-incrimination 
can be made whole. 
